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Abstract
John Worrall (2010) and Nancy Cartwright (2011) argue that randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) are “testing the wrong theory.” RCTs are designed to test inferences about
the causal relationships in the study population, but this does not guarantee a justified in-
ference about the causal relationships in the more diverse population in clinical practice.
In this essay, I argue that the epistemology of theory testing in trials is more complicated
than either Worrall’s or Cartwright’s accounts suggest. I illustrate this more complex
theoretical structure with case-studies in medical theory testing from (1) Alzheimer’s
research and (2) anti-cancer drugs in personalized medicine.
1 Introduction
John Worrall (2010) and Nancy Cartwright (2011) have both argued that there is a mismatch
between the theory being tested in a randomized controlled clinical trial (RCT) and the the-
ory that medical practitioners are actually interested in. Worrall describes this as the problem
of external validity: An RCT may support internally valid inferences about the causal rela-
tionships in the study population, but this does not guarantee a justified inference about the
causal relationships in the target population of interest—i.e., the usually more diverse patient
population that physicians actually encounter in the clinic. Since it is the causal relationship
between treatment and patient outcome in this more diverse population that we ultimately
care about, the RCT is “testing the wrong theory” (p.361). Or as Cartwright puts it: “an RCT
supports only an ‘it-works-somewhere’ claim,” but what we need are justified “it will work
for us” claims (p.1401).
There is something fundamentally correct in both Cartwright’s and Worrall’s arguments:
Many of the experimental components used in RCTs are designed to secure internal validity
at the expense of external validity. Yet, the epistemological relationship between translational
clinical trials (whether randomized or not) and the underlying scientific theories is more
complicated and, in some ways, more subtle than either of their accounts would suggest.
In this essay, I will illustrate this more complex theoretical structure through two examples,
drawn from trials in Alzheimer’s research and anti-cancer drugs for personalized medicine.
I argue that the more complicated epistemology vis-a-vis theory testing revealed in these
cases illuminates how Worrall’s and Cartwright’s philosophical conclusion relies on an overly
narrow conception of what trials can show.
2 Testing the Wrong Theory
Let us begin, as Worrall does, by imagining an RCT that is evaluating some new intervention
S as a treatment for some condition C in a sample population P. Supposing that the trial
is positive, what can we now conclude? Worrall cautions that we should not conclude the
“dangerously vague” claim that “S is effective for treating C”. Rather, the trial’s result only
warrants a narrower claim that “S when administered in a very particular way to a very
particular set of patients for a particular length of time is more effective than some comparator
treatment” (Worrall, 2010, p.361).
In other words, if we assume that the trial is internally valid, then it only justifies the
claim that “S was effective for condition C in population P”. But the practicing physician
needs to know how or whether this effectiveness claim generalizes to the variations on these
parameters that she is likely to encounter in the clinic. Does the relationship between S andC
also hold for more elderly patients (who are typically excluded from trials)? Does it hold if we
modify the dose and schedule to accommodate patients with co-morbidities or concomitant
medications? Is S also an effective intervention for treating the related condition, C∗? All of
these questions speak to the problem of external validity: An RCT may demonstrate a causal
relationship between S and C in the studied population P. But what we want to know is
whether this relationship holds for S and C in the population P—where S, C, and P are the
respective sets of plausible variations on the intervention, condition, and patient populations
that the physician encounters in clinical practice.
And as Worrall goes on to point out, there are often reasons to doubt that P is a good
representative (or perhaps even a member) of the relevant clinical set P. For example, the
limited observation time in an RCT weakens inferences about the safety of treatments for
chronic diseases, such as diabetes or arthritis. Even though large RCTs for these conditions
will usually include a few years of follow-up, the general patient population is likely to be
taking these medications for decades, and the RCT has not provided any evidence about
such long-term effects. Similarly, some RCTs will include time-consuming procedures or
expensive diagnostics as a part of the treatment regimen. Insofar as these same procedures
or tests are unavailable to the clinician (due to excessive cost, timing, or feasibility), then the
results of the RCT can fail to provide clinically relevant evidence about how the intervention
should be used in practice.
Cartwright (2011) extends this line of argument with some additional analytic resources.
She draws a distinction between experimental “vouchers” and ”clinchers” (cf. Cartwright,
2007). A “voucher” is an experiment that renders its conclusion more probable, whereas a
“clincher” is an experiment that deductively implies its conclusion. As she defines it, an ideal
RCT “where all the requisite premises are met” is a clincher—and this is presumably why
the RCT sits atop the hierarchy of evidence-based medicine.
But what are these “requisite premises” on which the “clinching” depends? Cartwright
enumerates three of them: (1) probabilistic dependence calls for causal explanation; (2) all
causal features in the study population P relevant to the outcome, except for the treatment,
are equally distributed between the treatment and control arms; and (3) the experimental
treatment S is the only plausible explanation for the observed difference in outcome between
the arms (p.1400).1
Let us set premise (1) aside here, since discussing the necessity (or not) of causal expla-
nations for probabilistic dependence will take us too far afield. Premises (2) and (3) deserve
some attention, however. As Cartwright acknowledges, RCTs are explicitly designed to sat-
isfy these two claims. Random treatment allocation, in particular, is typically justified for
exactly this reason: It controls for all known and unknown confounders in the study popu-
lation. Restrictive eligibility criteria, strict treatment protocols, allocation concealment, and
blinded outcome assessment are also characteristic features of the RCT—all of which are in-
troduced to eliminate the influence of bias, and thereby increase our confidence in premises
2 and 3.
But as Cartwright observes, these methodological steps also render the RCT less like
clinical practice. In the clinic, physicians will often modify a treatment’s dose or schedule,
or even switch patients from one drug to another, in the face of observed inefficacy, adverse
reactions, or side-effects. Patients are also neither blinded to their prescribed treatment nor
prescribed a treatment randomly. And just as Worrall argued, the clinical patient population
P is usually far more diverse than the study population P. Each of these differences between
the RCT and practice weaken the inference (i.e., generalizability) from causal claims about
what occurred in the study to causal claims about what will occur in the clinic.
To resolve this problem, Cartwright argues that we need justified claims about the causal
“capacities” of our treatment S—that is, theoretical warrant for thinking that S is a good
representative of S, C a good representative of C, and P a good representative of P. As she
puts it, we need the theoretical understanding of “why the treatment should have the power
to produce the outcome”. Unfortunately, all we get from an RCT is evidence that the S can
“work somewhere,” but this is not the same as having a justified theory of why we should
expect that “it will work for us” (p.1401).
3 External Validity and Underdetermination
As I suggested above, there is something fundamentally correct in Worrall’s and Cartwright’s
arguments. The RCT is typically designed to ensure internal validity—to “clinch” (to use
Cartwright’s term) the causal hypothesis that the experimental treatment S is efficacious
against condition C in the study’s population P. But as we just saw, the steps taken to guar-
antee the validity of this inference will often weaken its external validity. And this trade-off
1Cartwright does not use these variables in her formulation. I introduce them here to better accord with
the Worrall discussion above, but I trust it does no violence to her account. I have, however, weakened her
third premises. Her original wording—“the only explanation possible is that the treatment caused the outcome”
(p.1400, emphasis added)—is far too strong and inconsistent with any credible account of RCT methodology,
see for example Shadish et al. (2002) or Friedman et al. (2010).
on internal versus external validity leads us to Worrall and Cartwright conclusions: RCTs are
not testing the right theory. They are not telling us what we need to know.
This conclusion is consonant with others in the medical literature who have called for
more “comparative effectiveness” trials. For example, Tunis et al. (2003) argue that too many
RCTs evaluate the new drug against a placebo comparator, even when there is already a
proven effective treatment available. But if the only evidence about some new drug, A, is
its superiority to placebo, this does not provide clinicians with sufficient knowledge about
whether they should be prescribing A over the old standard of care. It can also be traced back
to Schwartz and Lellouch (1967), who drew a distinction between pragmatic and explan-
tory trials. A pragmatic trial is conducted under conditions similar to clinical practice and
seeks to answer a question about medical decision-making, e.g., “Which treatment should
physicians use in practice?” Whereas an explanatory trial is conducted under “ideal” scien-
tific conditions and seeks to answer a question about scientific understanding, e.g., “What is
the true biological effect of drug S ?” Their philosophical point is similar to Worrall’s and
Cartwright’s: Different experiments can address different theories, so we should be conduct-
ing experiments that answer the questions we are actually interested in. If we want to answer
clinically relevant questions, then we should be conducting pragmatic trials that maximize
external validity.
I take it, however, that Worrall and Cartwright are not simply echoing Schwartz and
Lellouch. They seem to be saying something stronger—namely, that RCTs are testing the
“wrong theory.” But what should we make of this claim? It is certainly true that most RCTs
adopt some version of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, and are therefore, strictly speak-
ing, tests of a single hypothesis (or single theory, if you prefer). Yet, it would be a mistake
to think that an RCT has no further theoretical importance. This much follows trivially from
underdetermination: Multiple scientific theories are involved in the design of an experiment
and therefore multiple scientific theories are implicated by the evidence produced—e.g., the-
ories about the therapeutic class (of which the drug is just one member) and its relationship to
disease modification; theories about the diagnostic assays and their relationship to the disease
prognosis; theories of disease ontology and pathophysiology. A negative RCT, for example,
does not necessitate that the researchers reject any causal link between the treatment S and
the condition C. Perhaps S will be effective against C in a slightly different population P∗.
The essential point of underdetermination is that there are always auxiliary hypotheses or
other theoretical modifications that can be made to accommodate the evidence.2
Since it seems unlikely that Worrall and Cartwright would object to the relevance of
theoretical underdetermination in RCTs, perhaps we ought to interpret their conclusion dif-
ferently. Maybe what they are really arguing is that the inferences to these other theories
are not well-justified by the evidence produced in an RCT. Cartwright, in particular, has the
conceptual resources to still conclude that RCTs are not “clinchers”. At best, they are only
“vouchers” for most of the relevant theoretical claims.
2Worrall discusses Duhem’s problem earlier in the same article (Worrall, 2010, p.358), but overlooks its
relevance for his argument on theory testing. See also Anderson (2006), Howick (2009), and Hey and Weijer
(2013) for more details discussions of Duhem’s problem and its importance for understanding the methodology
of clinical trials.
But if this is really their conclusion, much of the philosophical force of their argument is
lost. If the argument simply is the same as Schwarz and Lellouch’s or Tunis et al.’s—that we
need pragmatic trials to answer (or “vouch for”) clinically relevant questions—then I agree
entirely. But this does not seem consistent with much of what Worrall and Cartwright argue.
Even the most pragmatic trial is still just a “voucher” for clinical effectiveness. It is asking the
more clinically relevant question. Yet, if it differs in any way from the clinical setting, then
on Worrall’s and Cartwright’s view, it does not provide the right kind of evidential support.
Indeed, Cartwright emphasizes that “RCTs do not, without a series of strong assumptions,
warrant predictions about what happens in practice” (p.1400). And Worrall concludes that we
should really be doing observational studies rather than RCTs (p.362). But these conclusions
seem untenable. Even setting aside the obvious objection to Worrall that observational studies
have their own biases and methodological limitations (and are just as subject to underdeter-
mination), it is much to strong to demand of an experiment that it provide direct evidence
or causal certainty before we can draw externally valid inferences from it. “Clinchers” may
be a worthy philosophical ideal, but it does not follow that this is a plausible experimental
benchmark. Demanding deductive causal certainty is to ask more of an experiment than it
can plausibly provide.
4 Trials and Theoretical Implication
So where does this leave us? I agree with Worrall and Cartwright that the external validity
of RCTs is limited (as it is for every experiment). Yet, the story of clinical trials and theory
testing is more complicated than either of their accounts would seem to suggest. In this
section, I will discuss two examples of theory testing in medical research, each of which
illuminates a number of different ways in which trials have a theoretical import beyond their
specific testing hypothesis.
4.1 The Amyloid Cascade
Much of Alzheimer’s research has been driven by a mechanistic theory of the amyloid cas-
cade, which posits that the characteristic neurodegeneration of Alzheimer’s disease is caused
by amyloid-β plaque accumulation in the brain. However, as Karran et al. (2011) describe,
even as various “amyloid-centric” approaches have failed (e.g., the drugs tramiprosate, taren-
flurbil, semagacestat all failed in development), the fundamental amyloid cascade theory has
not been rejected. It has only been modified. They now distinguish between three different
theoretical amyloid-centric strategies: reducing amyloid-β production, facilitating amyloid-β
clearance, and preventing amyloid-β aggregation (p.700).
The drug company, Genentech’s, anti-amyloid monoclonal antibody, crenezumab, is one
such amyloid-centric drug currently undergoing clinical trials. In fact, it is being tested in
two different Alzheimer’s trials: One is a long-term single arm trial in patients with mild to
moderate Alzheimer’s symptoms; the other is a double-blind RCT testing crenezumab as a
neuroprotective agent in a genetically homogeneous population in Columbia.3 So what are
the theoretical implications of these trials?
For the single arm study, a negative result would provide evidence that crenezumab is not
an effective strategy for treating Alzheimer’s symptoms. It would also provide evidence that
similar monoclonal antibodies are unlikely to be effective, as well as further evidence for the
growing suspicion that once amyloid-β deposition has begun, removing amyloid-β is unlikely
to offer any therapeutic benefit (Golde et al., 2011). Whereas a positive result would confirm
both (a) that crenezumab and similar monoclonal antibodies may be viable strategies, and (b)
that an amyloid-β clearance strategy is effective.
Similarly, for the RCT in Columbia, a negative result would be evidence against crenezumab’s
effectiveness. It would also provide disconfirming evidence that preventing amyloid-β aggre-
gation offers any neurodegenerative protection. A positive result would confirm both of those
theories: preventing amyloid-β aggregation is a viable strategy and crenezumab, in particular,
is likely to be an effective treatment.
I am happy to grant a possible Cartwright objection here that neither of these trials
“clinch” any of these theoretical claims. But surely the more relevant question is whether
or not these trials provide sufficient evidence for informing clinical decision-making. And
on that point it is instructive to observe that part of the inclusion criteria for the Columbian
RCT is that all patient-subjects must be carriers of a specific gene mutation (PSEN1 E280A),
which is known to cause early-onset Alzheimer’s disease (cf. Belluck, 2012). Supposing that
this trial has a positive result, what are clinicians justified in concluding about other patient
populations at risk for Alzheimer’s? Worrall’s and Cartwright’s arguments imply that clini-
cians would still lack sufficient evidence for prescribing crenezumab outside of that specific
genetic population. But the theoretical warrant from these trials is not so weak. A success for
crenezumab lends evidential support for a range of theoretical propositions, some of which
would be sufficient to justify a clinician’s decision to prescribe an approved anti-amyloid
agent for her Alzheimer’s patients.
And it brings us to the heart of the issue: The directly tested theory in the Columbian
RCT could be thought of as resembling the narrow proposition, much as Worrall originally
construed it: “Crenezumab (S ) is effective for preventing the development of Alzheimer’s
disease (C) in the Columbian patient population possessing the PSEN1 E280A genetic mu-
tation (P).” But this does not exhaust the theoretical relevance of the trial. Whatever its final
result—but particularly if it is positive—researchers and clinicians will be in a better posi-
tion to draw valid (albeit inductive) inferences about future preventative strategies against
Alzheimer’s. Specifically, they would be justified in inferring potential efficacy for other
preventative anti-amyloid interventions (S); extrapolating the strategy for related conditions,
such as sporadic Alzheimer’s (C); or prescribing anti-amyloid medications for other patient
populations at high-risk for developing amyloid-related neurodegenerative diseases (P). To
be sure, these would all still be inferences with some degree of causal uncertainty, but it does
not follow from the lack of certainty that the inferences are unwarranted or unjustified. On
the contrary, if an anti-amyloid strategy is shown to be effective in an RCT, it would arguably
3See http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results?term=Crenezumab&Search=Search, retrieved February 27, 2014.
violate the physicians’ duty of care to withhold the treatment.
4.2 Personalized Cancer Medicine
In many ways, the amyloid cascade and Alzheimer’s case is an exemplar for the traditional
model of clinical translation, where the driving theories concern the experimental drug’s
effectiveness and the mechanism of disease. As we saw, a new Alzheimer’s drug that is suc-
cessfully vetted in trials is taken to confirm the particular drug’s effectiveness, the effective-
ness of the strategic class, and the underlying theories of disease pathophysiology. Whereas
the drug’s failure can be attributed to either a problem with one of these theories, a faulty
auxiliary hypothesis, or an operational error in one or more of the experiments.
The development of new personalized medicines (PM), however, is not well-characterized
by this model. The goal in PM is to equip the health-care system with an array of clinically
validated diagnostics, each of which would allow physicians to test their patients for the
presence or absence of a particular biomarker (e.g., a genetic mutation in their tumor spec-
imen), and then use these results to tailor decision-making about the appropriate course of
treatment. If successfully implemented, these biomarker diagnostics would potentially save
the health-care system billions of dollars and prevent needless patient suffering due to futile
interventions.
On its face, the epistemology of PM, in some ways, better accommodates Worrall’s and
Cartwright’s views. That is, PMs are designed to be effective in a very narrowly defined
patient population—i.e., only those patients with the specific biomarker. Thus, the study
population in RCTs for PM is far more likely to resemble the target population in clinical
practice. However, in contrast to the traditional model of medical research and drug devel-
opment, which hinges on effective therapeutic agents, the promise of PM largely depends
upon the development of high-quality biomarker diagnostics. And this further complicates
the theoretical implications of PM trials.
Consider the case of the alkylating agent, temozolomide. This drug was derived from the
older, widely-used (although quite toxic) cancer agent, dacarbazine, and works by attaching
an alkyl group to the cancer cell DNA, disrupting its growth and leading to cell death. Inter-
estingly, despite sharing the same mechanism of action, temozolomide and dacarbazine are
used in differenct cancers. Dacarbazine is approved for use against Hodgkin lymphoma and
melanoma; temozolomide is approved for use against anaplastic astrocytoma and glioblas-
toma multiforme.
Let us label this broadly defined mechanistic theory of using alkylating cancer drugs, T1:
T1 Alkylating agents (S 1 . . . S n) are a viable treatment strategy for some patient popula-
tions (P1 . . . Pn) with some cancers (C1 . . .Cn).
Thus, dacarbazine and temozolomide are two of the agents in the set S 1 . . . S n, and the vari-
ous cancers for which they have been approved are the members of the set C1 . . .Cn. One of
the challenges in cancer treatment is that the patient population that benefits from a particular
agent is not fully determined by their cancer-type. For example, not all patients with glioblas-
toma will benefit from temozolmide therapy. And this is where diagnostic biomarker assays
come into play. Indeed, the theory underlying all of PM is that there are genetic markers in a
patient’s tumor which can predict whether or not they are likely to benefit from a treatment.
One of the proposed biomarkers for temozolomide is the DNA repair gene O-6-methylguanine-
DNA methyltransferase, typically abbreviated as “MGMT”. A landmark study by Hegi et al.
(2004) identified a positive correlation between patient tumor response to temozolomide ther-
apy and high levels of methylated MGMT expression in their tumor specimens. Their con-
clusion can be characterized by the more specific theoretical hypothesis, T2:
T2 Temozolomide chemotherapy (S g) is most likely to be effective against glioblastoma
tumors (Cg) for those patients whose tumor specimens express high levels of methy-
lated MGMT (Pg).
We can think of T2 as a sub-theory of T1, since it describes a relationship among a single
triad of the treatment-condition-population parameters. And although T1 is uncontroversial
and has already been taken up in clinical practice, T2 is still being rigorously evaluated in
trials.4 But just as we saw with the amyloid cascade theory and crenezumab, a positive or
negative result in any of these trials has theoretical implications for both T1 and T2.
Yet, many of these trials have an additional dimension of uncertainty derived from the pre-
dictivity of the diagnostic assay (or assays) used to assess the methylated MGMT biomarker.
There are multiple techniques that can be used to determine the level of methylated MGMT
in a specimen and these different techniques do not all discriminate the glioblastoma patients
in the same way. In effect, they each define the target population Pg differently. One re-
cent study, for example, compared the sensitivity and specificity of a methylation-specific
polymerase chain reaction (MS-PCR) assay, which amplifies the relevant CpG islands of the
tumor specimen’s DNA, against an immunohistochemistry staining (IHC) assay, which as-
sesses the reactivity of tumor cells against a specific antibody (Lechapt-Zalcman et al., 2012).
They found that although both assays positively predicted benefit from temozolomide ther-
apy, the agreement between them was only about 70%. That is, 30% of the samples tested
positive for methylated MGMT on one test, but negative on the other.
This makes the recommendation for clinical practice more problematic. What is the true
patient population for our theory T2? Is it the patients whose samples test positive on MS-
PCR or IHC? A clinician’s decision to recommend temozolomide now hinges, in part, on
their selection of assay.
Lechapt-Zalcman et al. (2012) attribute this discrepancy largely to false-positives with the
IHC, which on its face, would seem to suggest that MS-PCR is the better assay for defining
the population Pg (p.4553). But they also note that the accuracy of MS-PCR depends upon
high-quality cryopreserved tumor specimens, which is expensive and not widely available
in the clinical setting (p.4552). Thus, despite its being the less accurate of the two assays,
an IHC assay may be the more clinically useful diagnostic. And this brings us back to the
problem of external validity. If MS-PCR is too expensive and unlikely to be used in the
clinic, then the Worrall or Cartwright arguments would suggest that future trials ought to only
4At the time of this writing, 10 trials are registered on clinicaltrials.gov examining the implications of temo-
zolomide and MGMT for the treatment of glioblastoma.
investigate IHC. Since IHC is the technique available to clinicians, then presumably, what
clinicians want is evidence about its capacity to delineate the responding patient population
Pg.
Unfortunately, even this seemingly reasonable suggestion still relies on an oversimplifi-
cation of the theoretical implications in these studies. To wit, we should observe that the
effective use of a diagnostic test depends on knowing its misclassification rate, i.e., the false-
positive and false-negative error rates. If a gold-standard diagnostic exists—that is, a diag-
nostic with perfect sensitivity and specificity—then these error rates are easy to determine.
One can simply compare the classification of the imperfect diagnostic, e.g., IHC, to the clas-
sification according to the gold-standard. Of course, in practice, there are no gold-standards.
Every diagnostic is imperfect. However, there are validated techniques for accurately esti-
mating the error rates of a test on the basis of multiple diagnostics. In essence, these are
robustness strategies, which use multiple independent (or sometimes conditionally depen-
dent) tests in order to arrive at estimates for the error rates of each individual diagnostic
(Joseph et al., 1995).
And indeed, relying on multiple diagnostics is precisely the strategy adopted in some of
the more recent temozolomide studies (cf. Lalezari et al., 2013). Given that IHC is known
to be inaccurate, researchers in these trials can use other, more accurate diagnostics (e.g.,
MS-PCR, pyrosequencing) in combination with IHC in order to derive better estimates for
the error rates when using a single IHC diagnostic test. These estimates can then be used by
clinicians, who may only have access to one diagnostic method, to make informed decisions
about their patient’s true biomarker status and potential benefit from temozolomide therapy.
The essential philosophical point here is that these rigorous biomarker studies do have
weaker external validity. They employ multiple diagnostics and robustness strategies, which
may be unavailable or unwieldy in clinical practice. Yet, their use of multiple diagnostics to-
ward a more robust theoretical understanding of the various individual techniques is precisely
what makes them informative for clinical practice. Contrary to Cartwright’s claim, these ex-
planatory (or “ideal”) trials are addressing the clinically relevant theoretical question—“What
is the accuracy of IHC for predicting response to temozolomide?” This is exactly the kind of
information that clinicians need to know in order to make the most of PM in cancer.
5 Conclusion
What theory or theories are tested in clinical trials? I have argued here that the answer to this
question is more complicated than suggested by either Worrall (2010) or Cartwright (2011) in
their critiques of RCTs. Their emphasis on the problem of external validity is helpful, insofar
as it draws greater attention to the need for studies that address clinically relevant questions.
But their stronger conclusion against the theoretical warrant provided by RCTs relies on a
significant oversimplification of trial epistemology.
As the problem of underdetermination entails, there are many theoretical implications of
trials. The focal testing hypothesis of the form “Treatment S is effective for condition C in
population P” is but one of the many theoretical claims that can be justifiably confimred,
modified, or refuted in light of an trial’s result. RCTs also generate evidence that is rele-
vant for general theories about the viability of the mechanistic strategy, or the underlying
pathophysiological theories of the disease, or the theories concerning biomarkers, diagnostic
assays, and the predictive relationship that these bear to patient prognosis and treatment. All
of these moving theoretical parts are potentially implicated. To suggest otherwise assumes
an overly narrow and untenable view about what RCTs can show.
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